We review rational and empirical reasons that comprehensive cognitive assessments are useful sources of information in the evaluation and treatment of learning disabilities. However, the existing evidence base that demonstrates the value of comprehensive cognitive assessments for this purpose is not nearly as strong as it needs to be. Proponents of comprehensive cognitive assessments for learning disability identification must do more to rigorously evaluate their beliefs or else concede the argument to those with better evidence.
Debates are terrifically entertaining when both sides stake out incompatible positions and then go for blood. However diverting they might be, these kinds of clashes rarely settle anything of importance in our field. Judging from their previous writings on the subject, we can anticipate that Fletcher and Miciak have argued for a smaller role for cognitive assessment in the identification and treatment of learning disabilities than we will here. However, the differences between us are not so large, in part because we have in recent years been moved by their research and by their arguments. We are not defenders of the status quo in the cognitive assessment field, and never have been (Kaufman, 1979; Kaufman, Raiford, & Coalson, 2015; Schneider, 2013a Schneider, , 2013b . We want reform as much as Fletcher and Miciak do, but we have reservations about their de-emphasis on measuring cognitive processing deficits in the identification of learning disabilities.
Our use of the term cognitive assessment refers not only to the use of IQ tests but of any ability test designed to identify cognitive processing deficits that influence academic skills. Most defenders of the role of cognitive assessment in the diagnosis and treatment of learning disabilities believe that a comprehensive cognitive assessment is essential and that knowing about a person's cognitive abilities leads to better decisions about interventions (Hale et al., 2010) . After rereading dozens of papers defending such assertions, including our own, we can say that this position is mostly backed by rhetoric in which assertions are backed by citations of other scholars making assertions backed by citations of still other scholars making assertions. There is nothing wrong with making and citing assertions, but to confuse such assertions with epistemological bedrock is to be epistemologically confused and groundless.
To be fair, the assertions are not mere assertions backed by nothing at all. They are backed by sound logic, persuasive reasoning, deep ethical intuitions, fine-tuned professional insights, vivid personal experiences, and a large body of indirect scientific evidence. The fact that many experts believe something based on reason, experience, and indirect scientific evidence does indeed qualify as evidence of sorts, but it is not strong evidence. We must not pretend that weak evidence is strong, but neither should we denigrate it. All scientific ideas now backed by strong evidence were once backed only by weak evidence, or no evidence at all. Weak evidence should not satiate our curiosity-it should whet our appetite for obtaining stronger evidence.
Do We Have Enough Mettle to Replace the Clay?
In the recent past, defending the role of cognitive assessment in learning disability identification has been like defending the great statue in Nebuchadnezzar's dream from well-aimed rolling boulders. The boulders are big, but the statue is bigger and made of sturdier stuff: The head is of gold, the chest and arms are of silver, the belly and hips are of brass, and the legs are of iron. What could knock down something so strong?
In like manner, contemporary cognitive assessment is based on some of the sturdiest findings psychological science has to offer. Cognitive assessment is increasingly based on sophisticated and robust theories of cognitive ability (Carroll, 1993; Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Horn & Cattell, 1966; McGrew, 2009) . Contemporary individual cognitive ability tests are the best they have ever been (Flanagan, Ortiz, & Alfonso, 2013) . The research literature on the validity of cognitive ability tests is enormous and, at least with respect to general ability tests, mind-numbingly consistent (Deary, Whalley, & Starr, 2009; Gottfredson, 1997; Jensen, 1998; Nisbett et al., 2012; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) . There may be a bit of quibbling about what to do about the smaller factors of ability, but there is no doubt that they exist and that they matter in theory if not always in practice (Glutting, Watkins, Konold, & McDermott, 2006; Kranzler, Benson, & Floyd, 2015; Schneider & Newman, 2015) . One could drown in the deluge of new research on the neuroscience of cognitive abilities and learning disorders (Deary, Penke, & Johnson, 2010) . Even the genetics of intelligence literature, after crying wolf for decades on the identification of specific genes that influence intelligence, is finally spotting real wolves-or, given the size of their effects, tiny wolf puppies (Belsky et al., 2016; Haggerty et al., 2010; Luby et al., 2012; Selzam et al., 2016) . Cognitive ability testing has demonstrated utility in many applications outside learning disability identification, especially in the early identification of giftedness, language delays, and intellectual disabilities (Kaufman, 2009; Kaufman et al., 2015) , personnel selection (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) , and evaluating the loss of adaptive functioning after brain injuries and the onset of dementia (Lezak, 2004) . When advocates of cognitive assessment are asked about the evidence that supports their position, this is the colossus they point to. It is mighty, massive, tall, and majestic. Who can deny it?
In Nebuchadnezzar's dream, the statue's feet were made of a brittle mix of iron and clay, and one rolling boulder knocked the great statue down. On the whole, the evidence that supports the construct validity of cognitive ability tests is deep, broad, supple, and strong. However, in certain critical places, the evidence for the utility of using cognitive ability tests to diagnose and treat learning disabilities is brittle and weak, and many assessment practices urgently need reform. The cognitive ability approach to learning disability identification has not quite fallen, but it is teetering and could topple at any time. Ditching the IQ-achievement discrepancy model of learning disabilities was a good start, but it is not enough. With disturbing regularity, we are finding out that the empirical basis for many practices consists of a lot less iron and a lot more clay than we had supposed.
Fletcher and Miciak have argued that it does not matter how beautiful the statue is or how strong certain parts of it are. If it cannot withstand the onslaught of a few rolling boulders, it does not deserve to stand. They have called for all but a few parts of the statue to be taken down and replaced with something else. We believe that cognitive ability tests, in the hands of smart, empathic, conscientious practitioners, are valuable tools for helping children with learning disabilities, and that with refinements in practice, could be even more useful than they are now. However, we understand that this belief needs stronger empirical justification, and the field needs the fortitude to face facts squarely. The statue can be propped up for a little while longer as we repair and fortify the feet and make a few other structural modifications, but we need to act quickly.
The Ideological Turing Test
We find few things more annoying than when debate opponents present inaccurate versions of our views and then claim victory by refuting positions we do not hold. We admire scholars who can pass what economist Bryan Caplan (2011) terms the Ideological Turing Test. That is, to ensure mutual understanding and to prevent opponents talking past each other, both debaters should be able to restate the other's views so convincingly that naive readers should find it difficult to determine which debater believes which position. With this ideal in mind, after reviewing numerous papers by Fletcher, Miciak, and their colleagues, we have attempted to articulate an accurate, but much-abbreviated account of their position on the assessment of learning disabilities. If we inadvertently misrepresent their views, we hope that they will correct us:
• The demonstrated utility of cognitive ability tests for applications outside the domain of learning disability identification is not disputed.
• Cognitive ability tests are invaluable tools for research aimed at understanding the fundamental nature of learning disabilities.
• Learning disabilities consist of academic skill deficits that result from core cognitive processing weaknesses rooted in genetic and environmental influences on brain functioning.
• Acknowledging that core cognitive processing deficits are causes of learning disabilities does not necessarily imply that measuring core cognitive processing deficits is a good use of time and resources.
• There is no evidence that attempting to remediate core cognitive processing deficits results in better academic outcomes than attempting to remediate academic skill deficits directly.
• There is little evidence that measuring cognitive processing deficits helps us to select better interventions than we would select after just measuring academic skill deficits.
• There is little evidence that measuring cognitive processing deficits allows us to predict with useful precision who will benefit more from interventions to remediate academic skill deficits.
• Most of the useful information that can be gleaned from a comprehensive assessment of cognitive abilities can be inferred from academic ability measures. What is relevant about cognitive ability measures is mostly redundant, and what is not redundant is mostly not relevant.
• Rather than performing time-intensive, costly comprehensive cognitive assessments, it would be better to diagnose learning disabilities by identifying individuals with low academic achievement despite effective instruction. If these individuals fail to respond to well-validated interventions for academic remediation, the individual can be said to have a learning disability. This failure to respond to intervention cannot be better explained by a host of commonsense exclusionary factors such as intellectual disability, inadequate instruction, language barriers, cultural disadvantage, physical disability, and mental illnesses (e.g., schizophrenia).
• The primary use of cognitive assessments in learning disability identification that can be supported currently is that they should be used to distinguish between learning disabilities and intellectual disabilities. Cognitive ability tests should be used for this purpose only in cases in which there is reasonable doubt about which diagnosis is correct, not as a matter of routine.
• Because it makes little sense to measure academic abilities before children have been given formal instruction, measuring cognitive precursors of academic abilities might be a useful tool for early identification of young children likely to need intensive help once schooling begins, if not sooner.
Points of Agreement with Fletcher and Miciak
Hard-hitting critiques should not only be tolerated, but welcomed. To respond defensively to validation efforts like those of Fletcher, Miciak, and their colleagues is not just a sign of weakness, but a cause of weakness. Even ideas we believe are untrue can be harnessed for good; some of the best ideas we have had in our careers have emerged while engaging with critics with whom we disagree. If practice is to improve, we must take all credible challenges seriously. Any practice that cannot withstand scrutiny deserves to be discarded. As ASK wrote several years ago, "I disagree with Dr Fletcher's conclusions, but I understand them and respect his opinions. The controversy about the value of IQ tests is a real one that has intelligent advocates on both sides. It will not soon disappear from newspapers, journals, and listservs (Kaufman, 2009, p. 284) ."
We Agree: The IQ-Achievement Discrepancy Definition of Learning Disability Was Not Helpful
Fletcher and many others deserve credit for their sustained efforts in pointing out the many problems with the IQachievement discrepancy model. Defining learning disability as unexpectedly low academic achievement despite average or better IQ has intuitive appeal, but it focuses on distal and relatively intractable influences on academic ability. Given the choice, it is more informative and effective to emphasize proximal and tractable causes of academic problems.
We Agree: The Response to Intervention (RTI) Movement Is a Pragmatic and Moral Step Forward
Withholding assistance from children with poor academic skills simply because their IQ is low has no justification. If they benefit from extra assistance (which they do), they should get it. Early proponents of this change in policy (including Fletcher) deserve accolades for rectifying this injustice.
We Agree: What Learning Disabilities "Really Are" Is Not Really the Issue There is a sense in which learning disabilities have been defined into existence. This does not mean that they are not real, not measurable, or somehow not important. For example, crimes are defined into existence by legislative bodies, and no one thinks of crimes as not real, not measurable, and not important. What is a crime in some jurisdictions is not a crime in others. Nevertheless, certain actions are predictably harmful, legal, or not. Likewise, certain patterns of individual differences have predictable consequences whether we call them learning disabilities or not.
Sometimes we and our allies have made the mistake of reifying the term learning disability, as if it exists independently of the collective authority of the scholars and legislators who have shaped its definition. We insist that we must measure cognitive processing deficits because that is what learning disabilities consist of (Ofiesh, 2006) . We object to the practice of labeling children who fail to respond to intervention as learning disabled on the grounds that not all children so identified will have cognitive processing deficits.
Unfortunately, one does not win arguments by insisting that older definitions of terms will forever have power over policy and good sense. Not long ago one could have argued-and some people did-that one must give an IQ test to diagnose a learning disability because its definition required an IQ-achievement discrepancy. Of course, the proper question is not whether IQ should be assessed if the definition requires it, but whether a definition that requires IQ to be assessed is at all proper. Many cogent theoretical, empirical, statistical, and ethical arguments have been presented for why defining learning disabilities as an IQ-achievement discrepancy is a seductively bad idea (Francis et al., 2005; Stanovich, 2005; Stuebing et al., 2002) . Even in places where it is still legal to diagnose learning disabilities under that definition, it is increasingly rare that professionals do so. The move away from that definition was not a matter of accuracy, but utility and propriety. People with IQ-achievement discrepancies still exist, but the field has come to understand that distinguishing people primarily by that criterion is not particularly useful and in some respects results in harm.
Words change their meaning all the time, even if we as individuals do not like the changes. You can insist that September, not July, is the seventh month because September means "seventh" in Latin. You can insist that others are wrong to use terrific to mean "extremely good" instead of its original, obvious, and straightforward meaning of "causing terror." These are not winning arguments. Words mean what language communities intend them to mean. We are the definers, not the defined.
Persistent failure to respond to appropriate intervention is an important concept, but it is, in our opinion, best conceived as a correlate of disability, not a defining feature. However, if the field collectively decides to label people with the term learning disability primarily by this criterion, it would not be the first time a disorder was defined primarily in terms of behavioral outcomes than in terms of dysfunctions per se (e.g., conduct disorder). If we as a field decide that it is better to define learning disabilities in such a way that measured cognitive processing deficits are not an essential feature, we need not let past definitions boss us around. To be sure, children with cognitive processing deficits will still exist, and they still will have particular problems even if they do not have a learning disability label anymore. If we still want a term that refers to cognitive processing deficits that interfere with academic skills, we will have to invent a new one so as to avoid confusion.
We Agree: Different Definitions of Learning Disability Result in Different Populations Being Identified
Unlike the IQ-achievement discrepancy model, several variants of the so-called Pattern of Strengths and Weaknesses (PSW) definition of learning disabilities are widely endorsed (Flanagan et al., 2013; Hale & Fiorello, 2004; Naglieri & Das, 1997a) . Different definitions of learning disability often result in markedly different groups of children being identified as learning disabled (Maki et al., 2016; Miciak, Fletcher, & Stuebing, 2016; Miciak, Fletcher, Stuebing, Vaughn, & Tolar, 2014; and likely are associated with different treatment outcomes (Burns & Senesac, 2005; Swanson & Hoskyn, 1999) . To treat all definitions of learning disabilities as the same simply because they share the same label is to engage in the jingle fallacy (Kelley, 1927, p. 64) . A lot of trouble can be avoided if we use clearly different terms to refer to clearly different concepts.
Different PSW approaches may have certain commonalities, but they represent substantially different conceptualizations of learning disability. For example, under the system espoused by Hale & Fiorello (2004) , it is possible for someone who reads well-better than average, even-to have a reading disability if the person is otherwise especially talented. In contrast, such a person cannot be labeled as having a learning disability under the system advocated by Flanagan and colleagues (2013) . Nevertheless, both sets of scholars would agree that cognitive processing deficits influence reading ability at every level of intellectual ability, whether we give them the learning disability label or not. No one would deny that a real loss has occurred if, for example, a child who previously scored 2 SD above average in reading comprehension skills now scores only average after a traumatic brain injury. It is easy to imagine that there could be developmental processes that have similar negative effects. We do not need to agree about whether the term learning disability applies in such a condition for us to agree that such negative influences on reading comprehension exist.
We Agree: Learning Disabilities Are Inherently Dimensional Learning disability research is in a fallen state as a direct result of its original sin: dichotomizing dimensional data. The data that underlie learning disability diagnostic decisions are mostly continuous and normal. There is no evidence of clumping in the multidimensional space of cognitive and academic abilities (Fletcher, Lyon, Fuchs, & Barnes, 2006, pp. 28-30) . Treating learning disabilities as categorical constructs leads to large and needless distortions in the empirical literature.
The conversion of continua to categories via arbitrary thresholds entails logical and practical problems every bit as subtle and outrageous as any of Zeno's paradoxes. Unless the continuous variables that underlie the diagnostic categories have validity coefficients much higher than any existing ability tests, achieving diagnostic accuracy is essentially hopeless. No matter where we set our cut score thresholds, large numbers of children with barely different scores will be on opposite sides of a decision point. Dichotomization results in treating diagnostic near-misses and egregious diagnostic blunders as mistakes of equal magnitude. Any diagnostic system that does not respect the continuous nature of learning disabilities is doomed to be deemed too unreliable for responsible use (Stuebing, Fletcher, Branum-Martin, & Francis, 2012) .
The biological brain is "to put it bluntly, bad at logic, good at Frisbee" (Clark, 2004, p. 5) . Respecting the continuous nature of learning disability requires a shift to a kind of thinking we humans find to be quite difficult: probabilistic reasoning with continuous variables. The question is not whether a learning disability is present, yes or no. The question is the degree to which an academic skill is being depressed by weaknesses in one or more cognitive abilities. For example, suppose that a well-validated model of reading decoding tells us that all else equal, the direct effect of working memory capacity is 0.2 "standard deviation (SD) units." If the child's working memory capacity is 1 SD below the mean (standard score or SS = 85), then we can estimate that the reading decoding ability is −0.2 SD (SS = 97). If the child's observed reading decoding ability is much lower than that, 2 SD below the mean (SS = 70), we still have a lot of explaining to do. Thus far, we have only accounted for 3 points in a 30-point deficit. Working memory has not "failed" as an explanation, but as a single explanation it is woefully incomplete. We will need to look elsewhere for additional reasons the child is behind, including relevant influences outside the cognitive and academic ability domain.
We Agree: Distinguishing Sharply Between Cognitive and Academic Predictors Is Arbitrary and Counterproductive
Reflecting the human preference for dichotomies, the learning disability research community regularly divides abilities into two piles: cognitive and academic. Obviously, academic abilities are just as "cognitive" as any other ability, but by convention the term cognitive is used to refer to abilities not directly taught in school. Traditionally, so-called "cognitive abilities" are predictors and academic abilities are outcomes. A moment's reflection will make it clear that, for example, word reading skill is an essential ingredient of reading comprehension. Thus, word reading is both an outcome we care about for its own sake and also a predictor of reading comprehension. To omit word reading skills from consideration when studying reading comprehension, and thereby limit the analysis only to "cognitive predictors," is like backing away from something nearby so that one can study it with binoculars. Fletcher and colleagues are certainly not the first to disregard the artificial cognitive/academic distinction but they are making headway in developing sophisticated models, in which cognitive and academic predictors exist in an interdependent nomological network (Ahmed et al., 2016; Shankweiler et al., 1999) . It is hard for us to imagine that such work is all for naught and not for practical use with individuals someday.
If We See the Same Evidence and Acknowledge Its Relevance, Why Don't We Agree Yet?
When sober, sensible, and respected scholars confront you with substantial evidence that disconfirms your prior beliefs, what is the proper response? A number of first-rate scholars, including Fletcher and Miciak, have produced a body of work that has shaken our confidence in several of our beliefs about the proper role of cognitive assessments in learning disability diagnosis. Yet, we are not persuaded that cognitive assessment should be abandoned. Why not?
People on opposing sides of an argument can become increasingly impatient with each other if they are not mindful of the differential effect of new evidence on people with different histories and prior beliefs. Even when both sides are perfectly rational and agree on the weight of the new evidence, there can be legitimate reasons for them to disagree about its implications. To illustrate, imagine that four medical doctors are in a dispute about whether a new treatment produces successful outcomes for people with a particular medical condition. Two doctors claim to have a 90% success rate with the treatment. The other two physicians are skeptics, claiming only a 10% success rate, which is not better than the success rate of placebo treatments.
To settle the matter, the four doctors agree to monitor the next 10 cases to receive the treatment, and an impartial observer is called in to make sure that everything is done properly. Of the 10 new cases, only 1 has a successful treatment outcome. The impartial observer deems the skeptics to have carried the day. However, the advocates do not concede defeat. One of the advocates is no longer as enthusiastic about the treatment as before but still believes that it has some utility. The other advocate remains steadfastly convinced that the treatment is effective.
A little annoyed, the skeptics propose that they monitor an additional 90 cases to bring the total up to 100 cases. The advocates agree that this is a good idea. Of the 100 cases treated, only 10 have a good outcome. Because this success rate is not better than the success rate of placebo treatments, the impartial observer again declares the skeptics the victors, this time more vigorously. The advocate who had been wavering earlier now concedes that the treatment is not effective. However, to the dismay of all, the firm advocate is not yet persuaded. (Years ago, ASK had a first-hand experience with this phenomenon. He was talking with Louise Bates Ames, Director of the Gesell Institute and a staunch advocate of Gesell's maturational approach to development. ASK confronted Dr Ames with strong empirical evidence that a child's "teething level" was an inadequate predictor of school readiness or school achievement. ASK cited his own research along with the clear-cut results of a doctoral dissertation study conducted by Dr Ames's own daughter, Joan Chase. Dr Ames said, "Yes-but we all know how important a child's rate of teething is for determining reading readiness.")
The firm advocate admits that a 90% success rate is no longer a credible claim but believes that perhaps the real success rate is more like 50%. The other doctors are gobsmacked! Did they not all just observe a 10% success rate? "Yes," says the now-not-so-firm advocate, "but I have previously had a lot of success with the treatment, and I would like to see more evidence before I abandon hope in the treatment."
In this illustration, all five doctors are equally impartial and equally rational, even the seemingly obstinate doctor who is still unpersuaded by the evidence the others find convincing. As depicted in Figure 1 , all the doctors used perfect Bayesian reasoning to update their beliefs according to the new evidence. (In Figure 1 , the doctors' beliefs about the success rate of the treatment are shown as probability density functions of the beta distribution, in which the two shape parameters are the total number of successes and failures respectively each doctor has observed at each time period.) The reason they disagreed at each time point was they had different prior beliefs based on different experiences with the treatment. Both the advocates had the same "90% success rate," but one had seen only 10 cases whereas the other had already seen 100 cases. Although both viewed the new evidence impartially, the firm advocate weighed the new evidence against a more substantial body of prior evidence and thus required an even larger body of new evidence to be convinced that the treatment was not effective.
If the success rate continues to be low, and everyone uses Bayesian reasoning to update their beliefs, even the firm advocate will eventually concede the argument. In this example, the skeptics were correct, and in hindsight it seems wasteful to have to wait so long to settle the argument. However, skeptics are not always right, and not all questions have simple and clear answers. It is thus healthy for a field to have people who are slower to change their minds. Perhaps the firm advocate will discover that the previous high success rate was not an illusion, but a result of a slightly different procedure or because the treatment works only in certain populations.
Almost all of published defenses of cognitive assessment in the identification and treatment of learning disabilities, including our own papers (Hale, Kaufman, Naglieri, & Kavale, 2006; Schneider, 2013b) , made the point that cognitive assessment helps professionals to understand the cause of the academic difficulty and that knowing the cause is helpful in selecting the correct course of action for treatment. In almost every case, this point was made as if it were self-evident, and it was unaccompanied by citations of high-quality evidence specifically relevant to this point. We imagine that for scholars on the other side of this debate such statements are maddening to read. One possibility is that these "experts" are simply incompetent. Perhaps it is some mass delusion. Perhaps vanity, stubbornness, or self-interest is the problem. We think not.
It might be helpful for those on the other side to imagine how counter-intuitive their argument sounds to those of us who think measuring cognitive abilities to diagnose learning disabilities is a good idea. Fletcher, Miciak, and colleagues believe that cognitive processing deficits are integral to the definition of learning disabilities, but that there is little need to measure cognitive deficits directly. That argument is a tough sell. In most people's experience, knowing things is preferable to not knowing things. To slightly misquote Sir Francis Bacon, "Knowledge is power."
It is not mere stubbornness that makes cognitive assessment advocates hold the line in the face of disconfirming evidence. Any question of importance concerning human beings is more complex than one study can answer. Human interaction in research studies is often far messier than our clear-cut statistical printouts would suggest. Most of us who provide direct services, out of necessity, have had to draw on personal insights and professional lore that have never been systematically evaluated and probably never will. When one has plausible reasons for one's beliefs and many experiences that are consistent with those beliefs, it takes especially strong counter-evidence over a long time to change those beliefs. However, beliefs do change, sometimes even in the same person.
Do Cognitive Assessments Help Predict Response to Intervention?
Many researchers find that cognitive abilities do not predict response to intervention well, or sometimes, at all. For example, Gresham & Vellutino (2010) found that IQ did not predict word-level reading improvements in struggling readers in the early elementary school years. Based on their meta-analysis of 37 studies, Burns and colleagues (2016) concluded that cognitive assessment does not allow for accurate prediction of response to intervention. However, there is an emerging body of evidence that inadequate responders to intervention do have different cognitive profiles compared with adequate responders, at least at some ages and for certain kinds of problems and interventions (Cho et al., 2015; Geary, Hoard, Nugent, & Bailey, 2012) .
These studies provide cognitive assessment advocates reasons to believe that cognitive abilities are in some cases related to intervention response, but no reasons to claim that cognitive ability assessments allow for accurate prediction of intervention response (Stuebing et al., 2015) . For example, Cho and colleagues (2015) examined the cognitive characteristics of (a) typical fourth grade readers, (b) adequate responders (students whose below-average reading skills were at least average after intervention), (c) inadequate responders with persistent reading comprehension problems only, and (d) inadequate responders with both persistent word reading and comprehension problems. Unsurprisingly, typical readers had generally higher cognitive abilities. Adequate responders also had generally higher cognitive scores than inadequate responders. Inadequate responders with persistent word reading and comprehension problems had lower phonological awareness and rapid naming abilities than inadequate responders with persistent reading comprehension problems only.
Broadly similar results (i.e., responders and nonresponders have statistically distinguishable cognitive profiles) have been found at other age ranges and by other researchers (Fletcher et al., 2011; Fuchs et al., 2005 Geary et al., 2012; Toste et al., 2014) . These studies provide evidence for the sensitivity but not the positive predictive value of cognitive ability assessments. That is, the fact that different outcome groups have different cognitive profiles on average does not necessarily imply that knowing a student's cognitive profile allows us to predict with accuracy how the student will respond to intervention. The cognitive profile differences in some studies differed by as much as a standard deviation on some variables. However, because of high levels of within-group variability, differences of this magnitude generally do not result in high positive predictive values in most settings.
A recent reading intervention study by should be particularly worrisome to advocates of cognitive assessment for learning disability identification. The study found no evidence for differential treatment response in children who met criteria for either of the two most prominent PSW methods for learning disability diagnosis (Flanagan et al., 2013; Hale & Fiorello, 2004) . It is too soon to say how this question will play out, but given the substantial psychometric concerns raised about these PSW methods Stuebing et al., 2012; Taylor, Miciak, Fletcher, & Francis, 2016) , it seems to us likely that a careful overhaul of these methods is going to be necessary if they are ever going to unambiguously prove their worth.
Evidence that Cognitive Assessments Lead to Better Intervention Outcomes
Even if it could be shown that cognitive ability assessments did allow for accurate prediction of intervention response, this fact alone would not justify giving cognitive assessments. To take a simple example, suppose we learn that the best available intervention for a problem has double the expected effect size for children with higher IQ compared with the expected effect size for children with lower IQ. By itself, this fact does not make measuring IQ worthwhile. If the same intervention is still the best course of action for children with lower IQ, no treatment decisions hinge on knowing a child's IQ (Willis & Dumont, 2006) .
Is there any evidence that basing academic intervention decisions on cognitive assessment results leads to better academic outcomes? Yes. Is it compelling evidence? There is exciting and intriguing evidence, but no compelling evidence. Furthermore, even if the evidence were compelling, it would need to be accompanied by careful cost-benefit analyses. We are not there yet.
Aptitude-by-treatment interactions refer to findings in which people of differing aptitude respond better to different kinds of intervention. To justify the time and effort of cognitive ability testing, there needs to be some sort of validated if-then decision tree, the simplest of which would be something like "If the assessment results are X, take action A. If the results are not X, take action B." There is a longstanding consensus that students with high IQ and students with low IQ differentially benefit from different kinds of instruction. Students with lower IQ tend to benefit more from instruction that is highly structured, complete, and direct whereas students with higher IQ benefit more from relatively unstructured, incomplete, and indirect instruction (Snow, 1992) . However, in most educational settings, students are not given different kinds of instruction based on IQ test results but are instead generally given different educational experiences on the basis of past academic performance, which of course is correlated with IQ. Thus, even though it is true that students with lower IQ benefit more from certain kinds of instruction, this fact does not justify giving IQ tests to all students. Usually, we can figure out who needs more highly structured instruction based on past academic performance. This is a specific instance of the more general point that Fletcher, Miciak, and their colleagues have made many times: often information from academic assessment data makes information from cognitive assessment redundant.
To justify cognitive assessment as a guide for selecting interventions, it would have to give us useful information we do not already have-and do so in a cost-effective manner. The few studies finding meaningful aptitude-by-treatment interactions share two important features. First, the researchers have a clear theory of how different abilities affect particular outcomes. Second, the researchers specifically designed interventions tailored to address those problems.
Perhaps the best and most direct evidence that cognitive assessment can be helpful in treatment planning comes from research by Jack Naglieri and his colleagues. Based on insights from the Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and Successive (PASS) theory of cognitive abilities (Das et al., 1994) , they hypothesized that planning deficits result in particular kinds of academic deficits related to strategy implementation. They developed an intervention, Planning Facilitation, which is specifically designed to help children with poor planning ability to develop better strategies for understanding text and solving math problems. In a series of intervention studies, school-age children were classified using the using the Cognitive Assessment System (Naglieri & Das, 1997b) according to cognitive deficit type. The intervention resulted in greater improvements in math (Iseman & Naglieri, 2011; Naglieri & Gottling, 1995; Naglieri & Johnson, 2000) and reading (Haddad et al., 2003) for children with planning deficits than for children with other deficits. The effect sizes for these studies are not small, with differential improvements as large as 1 SD. In contrast to studies that take a shotgun approach for measuring cognitive deficits to see how they predict responses to various interventions, these studies benefit from a tight alignment of theory, measurement, and intervention. The researchers carefully articulated a rationale for what should be measured, why it is relevant, and how the intervention specifically addressed the concerns of children with a particular deficit.
As impressive as these studies are, they do not yet constitute a winning argument for why cognitive assessment in general is necessary for learning disability diagnosis. Why not? If anything, they are a victory for PASS theory as measured by the Cognitive Assessment System and for the Planning Facilitation intervention in particular, not for cognitive assessment in general. More specifically, Naglieri and colleagues have provided wonderful, groundbreaking, but still tentative evidence for one particular treatment for children with one particular cognitive deficit. Although the intervention differentially helps those with planning deficits, there is not enough known to say that it is useless for people without planning deficits. If there is only one intervention known to be effective at all, we do not need to measure cognitive deficits ahead of time. We would simply give the same intervention to everyone and hope for the best. However, if there were a second treatment that was shown to be differentially effective for children with a different cognitive deficit, then a simple if-then decision tree for intervention selection could be constructed. Only at that point would classifying children by cognitive deficit be necessary. We suspect that such interventions could be developed and validated, but time will tell.
There are at least two studies that give reason for optimism that measuring differences in cognitive profiles can help practitioners to select among more than one intervention. Fuchs and colleagues (2014) found that fourth graders with poor math skills responded differentially to different kinds of math instruction depending on their working memory abilities. Students with very poor working memory improved their fraction skills more if given conceptual activities instead of math fluencyfocused exercises. Students with higher (but still low) working memory improved more if given math fluency-focused activities instead of conceptual activities. Though not specifically relevant to learning disabilities, Sternberg, Grigorenko, Ferrari, & Clinkenbeard (1999) found that college students in an introductory psychology course learned better when instruction was tailored to their specific profile of strengths and weaknesses in analytical, creative, and practical abilities.
When Not Assessing Fails, Give Assessing a Try
Giving a comprehensive cognitive assessment to all children who lag behind their peers in academic skills is a misallocation of resources. The RTI framework is a much more efficient way to help students. We believe that the expense of a comprehensive cognitive assessment is justified for learning disability assessment only after several rounds of well-implemented interventions have failed. What exactly constitutes a "round" of "well-implemented" intervention is admittedly ambiguous. At some point in the process, those responsible for designing and implementing interventions for children with learning disabilities become frustrated.
When all strongly supported solutions have failed, and no one can explain why, we are by definition at the frontier of what is known, at a place in which research can only give indirect guidance. It is a place practitioners find themselves in often. Although there is some evidence that measuring cognitive abilities results in better outcomes, it is admittedly underdeveloped. However, there is ample evidence that cognitive abilities are substantially related to academic achievement. Fletcher, Miciak, and their colleagues have been clear all along that cognitive abilities are an integral component of the theory of learning disabilities. If Kurt Lewin's truism (Marrow, 1969, p. ix) is the least bit true-There is nothing so practical as a good theory-it seems that investing some time in figuring out what is going on might be helpful. All else equal, knowing more is preferable to knowing less. It is intuitively plausible that knowing which cognitive deficits are likely interfering with academic success might result in better decisions when all other approaches have failed. Nevertheless, if future research shows that knowing more about a person's abilities regularly results in poorer outcomes, we would disavow even this modest claim.
How could our position-call it Last Resortism-be evaluated empirically? We could imagine studies in which recommendations from Fletcher and colleagues (2006) are implemented, but each time an intervention fails a coin is flipped to see whether a comprehensive cognitive assessment should be conducted before proceeding with a new intervention. If cognitive assessments are helpful in designing the next phase of intervention, the results should show that in most cases the slope of improvement increases after the cognitive assessment.
Comprehensive Cognitive Assessment, Empathy, and the Big Picture
We agree that for answering the narrow question of the presence/absence of a particular kind of learning disability, focusing on the most proximal cognitive and academic subskills is preferred. Using IQ as the primary explanation for every academic outcome would be a step backward. Developing a finely tuned explanatory model for each relevant outcome wherever possible should be a top priority of our field.
However, most evaluations have broader concerns than just whether a particular learning disability is present. For most aspects of our lives, there is not, nor will there ever be a well-validated regression equation to guide or decisions. A comprehensive assessment of cognitive abilities allows for an estimate of a person's overall capacity to act intelligently in a broad range of situations. The overall capacity to act intelligently to which we refer is not Spearman's g, but Wechsler's (1975) We, like Wechsler, believe that something happens to our understanding of a person during a comprehensive evaluation that goes beyond what can be found in a simple summary of the scores. As Wechsler (1958) noted:
We begin with a series of aptitude measures but somehow end up with an IQ. How is this possible? The suggested answer is that in the process we are using measures of ability primarily as a tool, that is, not as an end in itself but as a means for discovering something more fundamental. Then, when an examiner employs an arithmetic or a vocabulary test as part of an intelligence scale, the object of the examiner is not to discover the subject's aptitude for arithmetic or extent of his word knowledge, although these are inevitably involved, but his capacity to function in overall areas which are assumed to require intelligence. (p. 15) […] while intellective abilities can be shown to contain several independent factors, intelligence cannot be so broken up. Hence, no amount of refinement of tests or addition of factors will account for the total variance of an intelligence test battery, because the variance in intelligence test performance is due not only to the direct contributions of the factors themselves but also to their collective behavior or integration. (p. 23) Fletcher, Miciak, and their colleagues focus appropriately on those aspects of academic problems that can change: academic skills and their proximal precursors. A comprehensive cognitive assessment also covers more distal aspects of the problem that are not so easily changed (e.g., working memory capacity, processing speed, and spatial ability). The wisdom of knowing what must be accepted, if only temporarily, brings not despair, but serenity.
Difficult cases require looking at the big picture, and failing to consider cognitive abilities is to miss a big part of the big picture. Even so, a comprehensive cognitive assessment that is part of a comprehensive evaluation of the child may not lead directly to a specific intervention any more than studying history leads directly to specific policy recommendations. Before a successful plan can be generated, school psychologists often must think empathically and creatively so as to integrate a number of concerns about ability, identity, motivation, interest, social relations, learning history, and systemic influences on academic performance. Ideally, this empathy is transmitted to parents, teachers, and school personnel in a comprehensive case conceptualization that facilitates better decisions. Sometimes, the cognitive assessment data do not so much lead to better interventions but instead helps decision makers to remain patient, hopeful, and engaged when progress is slow or difficult.
Learning Disability Research's Much-Needed "Walter Mischel Moment"
The learning disabilities assessment field is undergoing a transformation as profound as the breakdown and subsequent reconstruction of personality psychology in the wake of the so-called person-situation debate. In that controversy, Mischel's (1968) literature review and critique of the field of personality psychology undermined the confidence of many scholars in their fundamental assumptions about personality traits. At issue was whether personality traits were meaningful constructs given that people's behavior was shown to be far less consistent across diverse situations than had been supposed.
The controversy about the meaningfulness of personality traits had been simmering for decades before it boiled over in the 1970s (Mischel, 2004) . The contention stayed hot through the mid-1980s and only cooled down after the heat was converted to light: A consensus of sorts emerged (Fleeson & Noftle, 2008a) . Although trait theorists eventually were able to give reassuring evidence that traits are meaningful constructs, Mischel was not wrong about the degree of behavioral inconsistency people exhibit (Epstein, 1979) . Trait theorists still believe personality traits are useful, but recognize that traits do not exert as powerful an influence on moment-to-moment decisions as they had once assumed. However, Mischel's critique did not merely result in lower estimates of personality traits' predictive power; it motivated a far more sophisticated understanding of the subtle interactions of personality and situations (Fleeson & Noftle, 2008b; Mischel & Shoda, 1995) .
Historical analogies are never exact and are perilous when taken too seriously. Nevertheless, our best guess is that something akin to the resolution of person-situation controversy in personality psychology will occur in the current debate about the proper role of cognitive assessment in learning disability identification. Given current trends, the quantity and quality of research exposing the limitations of cognitive assessment will increase to the point that none but the most obstinate scholars will be unmoved. In some cases, advocates of cognitive assessment will retreat from exaggerated claims, in others they will push back against skeptics with compelling research of their own, and in still others they will develop new theories and new assessment procedures with demonstrated utility. Increasingly sophisticated if-then decision trees will be developed about when, where, how, why, and with whom cognitive assessment is warranted for the identification and treatment of learning disabilities.
We are grateful for Fletcher and Miciak's efforts to improve the science and practice of this field. We do not have to agree with them on every point to see the value in what they do. By stripping away harmful misconceptions, their criticisms have already and will continue to make cognitive assessment more focused, practical, and ethical. We understand that our advocacy of comprehensive cognitive assessments would have more potency if we had more direct evidence. We and our allies need to acknowledge the imbalance of evidence that exists currently. To do so is not to admit defeat, but the first step toward putting our field on firmer epistemological ground. It is not irrational to believe that comprehensive cognitive assessment is more beneficial than can be supported by current evidence. It is irrational to pretend that the evidence is not needed and that all is well in our field.
It is important that we continue to foster and support the kind of empirical research that shows potential links between cognitive profiles and academic outcomes. For example, a special issue of the Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment that will appear in print in 2017 included an array of studies of the kinds of errors students make in reading, writing, math, and oral language (Breaux, Bray, Root, & Kaufman, 2016) . The findings of these studies, taken together, show that students with different PSW profiles display different patterns of errors on tests of academic achievement; and that students with different diagnoses (e.g., intellectual disability, learning disability in math, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder) are distinguishable in the kinds of achievement errors that they make (for overviews and analyses of these studies, see Flanagan, Mascolo, & Alfonso, 2016; Mather & Wendling, 2016; McCloskey, 2016; Montgomery, Dumont, & Willis, 2016) . The results of these studies do not provide confirmation that PSW directly affects choice of intervention, but they do provide an empirical foundation and conceptual link for conducting such studies in the future. Current practices need reform, to be sure. However, cognitive abilities are too integral to academic difficulties for them to be, in the final accounting of the matter, irrelevant for helping individuals.
